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Three Essays on Debt
Lijun Wang
This dissertation contains three essays on debts of different forms that make con-
tributions to the areas of international macroeconomics and spatial economics. In
particular, the first two essays study sovereign debts. They examine sovereign de-
fault behaviors together with interactions between sovereign defaults and countries’
costs of borrowing. The third essay looks at bank loans. It explores the possibility
of understanding economic agglomeration through distance-related financial frictions
firms face when borrowing from banks.
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Preface
Economic agents use debt as a vehicle for external financing in different contexts.
Households take on debts such as credit card balances to finance daily spendings,
firms take on debts such as bank loans to finance productions and investments, and
governments take on debts such as sovereign bonds to finance public operations and
programs.
This dissertation contains three essays on debts of different forms that make con-
tributions to the areas of international macroeconomics and spatial economics. In
particular, the first two essays study sovereign debts. They examine sovereign de-
fault behaviors together with interactions between sovereign defaults and countries’
costs of borrowing. The third essay looks at bank loans. It explores the possibility
of understanding economic agglomeration through distance-related financial frictions
firms face when borrowing from banks.
Chapter 1 is titled Defaultable Sovereign Debts under Plausible Risk-Averse Pric-
ing. It addresses an asset-pricing anomaly in structural sovereign default models.
When calibrated to match historical default probabilities, these models imply a level
of sovereign bond credit spread that is too low to be commensurate with data. One
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line of research attempts to improve the model by building an extension of risk-
averse investors into it; however, such efforts have not entirely resolved the problem.
Rather than making another attempt in this direction, chapter 1 takes a step back
and examines the feasibility of this entire approach. Can any plausible extension of
risk-averse investors into the standard model resolve the low-spread anomaly? If not,
it is meaningless trying to build one in the first place.
To be precise, chapter 1 deems an investor extension plausible as long as it implies
an investor pricing behavior that does not allow arbitrage relative to existing bonds
in this market. However, by incorporating a pricing kernel that is consistent with the
“market price of risk” in the data (and hence leaving no room for arbitrage), the low-
spread anomaly in sovereign default models can barely be improved. Relying on this
result, chapter 1 concludes that no plausible extensions of risk-averse investors can
resolve the low-spread anomaly. To improve the structural sovereign default models
in this regard, we should look elsewhere for theoretical resolutions.
Chapter 2 is titled The Home Bias of Sovereign Borrowing. It looks at the is-
sue of domestic debt being missing from existing sovereign finance theories. Notably,
domestic debt accounts for nearly two-thirds of total sovereign borrowing, and yet ex-
isting theories remain completely agnostic on this and assume countries only borrow
externally. To properly account for both domestic and external debts in one theoret-
ical framework, what are the relevant trade-offs to consider? How does the “home
bias” arise? What is driving the cross-country heterogeneity in these behaviors?
To answer these questions, chapter 2 develops a novel general equilibrium model,
in which the benevolent government can strategically choose to borrow from domestic
2
or external markets. The model can generate the observed “home bias” in sovereign
borrowing as an equilibrium outcome through the government’s strategic financing
behaviors. By introducing a capital control constraint on foreign investments within
the domestic market, the model implies that looser inflow capital controls for a coun-
try are associated with a stronger home bias in its sovereign borrowing. Using a
cross-country dataset, chapter 2 also finds support for this association in the data.
Chapter 3 is titled The Financial Channel of Economic Agglomeration. It revis-
its a classic question of how economic agglomeration arises from a novel financial
perspective. Traditionally, urban economists interpret economic agglomeration as an
outcome of firms choosing to locate near each other, because doing so begets increas-
ing returns to scale in their productions. Alternatively, chapter 3 presents evidence
that explains economic agglomeration as a result of firms more likely emerging to-
gether near banks, because proximity to banks reduces frictions to obtain loans.
To show that a bank can cause firms to agglomerate in its proximity by easing
their financial frictions, chapter 3 carefully designs a natural experiment to examine
what a quasi-exogenous bank relocation does to the bank’s surroundings. A standard
difference-in-difference approach shows that relocation of a bank closer to a region
indeed causes more supply of bank loans in that region, and subsequently causes
more firm establishments to emerge and agglomerate within the same area. This
result supports the financial channel of economic agglomeration, and it also suggests
the importance of credit availabilities for regional economic growths.
Without further ado, we now begin expositions of the entire dissertation below.
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Chapter I.
Defaultable Sovereign Debts under
Plausible Risk-Averse Pricing
There is an asset-pricing anomaly in structural models that examine sovereign defaults
among emerging economies (e.g., Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Arellano, 2008).1 When
calibrated to match historical default probabilities, these models imply a level of
sovereign bond credit spread that is too low to be commensurate with data.2
For a quick illustration, one such model is calibrated to match the Argentine
economy per Arellano (2008) in Figure I-1. Given a fitted output process, the model
can predict the observed sovereign default around 2001. For the years leading up to
1Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) make a seminal contribution to modeling sovereign defaults. By
introducing debt market exclusion for countries in default, they present a stylized model to analyze
sovereign defaults as a country’s strategic choices. Arellano (2008) later develops this approach into
a full-fledged structural model, which one can calibrate for quantitative simulations.
2There is another strand of literature that explicitly studies sovereign bond yields and credit
spreads (e.g., Duffie and Singleton, 1999; Duffie, Pedersen, and Singleton, 2003). Unlike those
structural sovereign default models mentioned above, this literature treats sovereign defaults as
exogenous credit events.
4
Figure I-1: Model vs. Data — Argentina 2001 Default Episode
(Vertical Axis: Left - Percentage, Right - Log Deviations)
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the default, it also successfully simulates the observed dynamics in macroeconomic
variables such as the trade balance. However, the model implies a time series of
Argentine bond credit spread3 that is too low to be comparable with its empirical
counterpart.4
3The model defines the credit spread as the interest rate at which the Argentine government is
borrowing, less the international risk-free interest rate benchmark. Its empirical counterpart is the
prevailing interest rate at which the Argentine government is borrowing, less the 5-year U.S. bond
yield.
4Yue (2010) shows that model-implied credit spread becomes even lower when she incorpo-
rates post-default debt recoveries into the standard model. In her set-up, the model’s asset-pricing
performance is even more problematic.
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To resolve this low-spread anomaly, one line of research attempts to improve the
model by building an extension of risk-averse investors into it, hence replacing the
current risk-neutral pricing set-up.5 By doing so, bond investors in the model can
charge, on top of actuarially fair compensations, an additional premium for bearing
default risks. This idea also finds empirical support. Longstaff et al. (2011) study an
extensive set of sovereign CDS data and find that the risk premium indeed accounts
for a significant portion of the sovereign bond credit spread.6
A few attempts have been made to extend the model in this direction, result-
ing in minimal success. Lizarazo (2013) introduces bond investors whose preferences
exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). In her model, the wildest param-
eter assumptions can only resolve nearly half of the low-spread anomaly. Uribe and
Schmitt-Grohe (2017) bring U.S. household investors with constant relative risk aver-
sion (CRRA) utilities into the model. However, this set-up can barely improve the
low-spread anomaly across all parameter specifications.
Rather than making another attempt in this direction, chapter 1 takes a step back
and examines the feasibility of this entire approach. Can any plausible extension
of risk-averse investors into the model resolve the low-spread anomaly? If not, it is
meaningless trying to build one in the first place. This question is challenging because
5Alternatively, another line of research by Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) and Arellano and
Ramanarayanan (2012) builds an extension of debt maturity structures into the model, hence re-
placing the current one-period bond set-up. These efforts have proven helpful in improving the
model’s asset-pricing performance. On a side note, Garcia-Schmidt (2015) introduces asymmetric
information on debtor country incomes between bond investors and debtor countries. The idea is
to see if adverse selection by bond investors increases the credit spread to a level that resolves the
model’s asset-pricing anomaly. However, this approach achieves very minimal quantitative success.
6Longstaff et al. (2011) find that “[o]n average, the risk premium represents about a third of
the credit spread” in sovereign bonds.
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it aims to make a statement on not one but all possible extensions that are plausible.
However, being plausible sounds vague and subjective. What exactly does it
mean when we use it to describe an extension of risk-averse investors into the model?
To clarify, chapter 1 deems an investor extension plausible as long as it implies an
investor pricing behavior that is consistent with the “market price of risk” in the
data. In other words, an equivalent way of asking the question is: can we resolve the
low-spread anomaly by introducing risk-averse investors who price risk in a way that
does not allow arbitrage with existing bonds in this market?
To introduce such risk-averse pricing behaviors into the standard model, chapter 1
uses directly the investors’ stochastic discount factor (SDF, or equivalently the pricing
kernel, denoted as Mt+1). Doing so has three advantages. First, it abstracts away
from specific economic models7 of risk-averse investors while pricing bonds.8 Second,
it adapts to the standard sovereign default model without compromising tractability
in modeling sovereign defaults (Arellano, 2008). Third, it is possible to construct a
risk-averse pricing kernel that is plausible per our discussions above (Cochrane and
Piazzesi, 2005).
To construct a pricing kernel that is arbitrage-free relative to existing bonds in
the market, we follow an algebraic procedure in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005), who
use prices and forward rates on one- through five-year zero-coupon U.S. government
7Existence of the SDF does show that there is an economic model that implies a pricing behavior
consistent with the SDF; however, an examination of the SDF does not quickly lead one to the correct
economic model. Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) have performed such an inquiry on discount
factors for stocks.
8Recall that the SDF prices risk based on the law of one price and the condition of no-arbitrage
via the primitive pricing equation P
(n)
t = Et(Mt+1Mt+2...Mt+n−1), in which P
(n)
t denotes the
period-t price of a discount bond that returns 1 unit of consumption in n periods.
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bonds. Notably, running forecasting regressions of excess bond returns on a combina-
tion of forward rates, they find unprecedented forecastability (with R2 up to 0.44).9
To account for this forecastability while modeling how investors price risk in these
bonds, they algebraically derive a pricing kernel that leaves no room of arbitrage
relative to the included bonds in those regressions. It is this kernel we now introduce
into the standard sovereign default model as the plausible risk-averse pricing kernel
(denoted as M∗t+1).
10
With the plausible risk-averse pricing kernel, the model yields only minimal im-
provements on its simulated credit spread. Again, for the years leading up to the
2001 Argentine default episode, the standard model implies an average credit spread
of 3.39%, while the model with the plausible risk-averse pricing kernel yields an aver-
age credit spread of 3.65%. Despite the 0.26 percentage point increase, the observed
Argentine bond credit spread for the same period has an average of an unreachable
10.25%. These results suggest that no plausible extensions of risk-averse investors
into the model could satisfactorily resolve the low-spread anomaly. To improve the
model’s asset-pricing performance, we should look elsewhere for theoretical resolu-
tions.
This chapter organizes itself as follows. Section A outlines a benchmark sovereign
default model with risk-neutral pricing per Arellano (2008). Section B modifies the
model to introduce risk-averse pricing via the SDF framework. Section C constructs
9Also, see Campbell and Shiller (1991) and Fama and Bliss (1987) for earlier work on this matter.
10One implicit assumption in applying M∗t+1 here is that investors on emerging market sovereign
bonds also have access to these zero-coupon U.S. government bonds and the associated forward
contracts; otherwise, being arbitrage-free relative to these bonds does nothing in restricting pricing
behaviors.
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the plausible risk-averse pricing kernel M∗t+1 and adapts it into the model. Finally,
section D concludes the chapter.
A. Benchmark Model with Risk-Neutral Pricing
The benchmark model closely follows Arellano (2008). It is a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model containing a continuum of households, risk-neutral inter-
national investors, and a benevolent government.
Households solve a standard inter-temporal consumption problem. Their repre-
sentative agent receives a Markov stochastic stream of tradable consumption goods
yt that follows a transition function f (yt+1, yt) and has compact support Y .
11 Its
objective is to maximize its expected lifetime utility, and in doing so, it chooses its
consumption ct in each period.





βtE0 [u (ct)] ,
subject to their inter-temporal budget constraint that takes shape after the govern-
ment makes its borrowing and default decisions each period. β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the
households’ subjective period discount factor. u(ct) denotes the households’ period
utility function. It takes a standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
functional form u (ct) =
c1−σt −1
1−σ , in which σ denotes the households’ coefficient of
11In other words, yt ∈ Y,∀t.
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relative risk aversion.
Households borrow from the international financial market through their govern-
ment via its issued sovereign bonds. If the government is not in default of its bonds,
households’ budget constraint is
ct = yt +Bt − qtBt+1,
in which Bt is the nominal value of previously issued bonds households have to repay
in period t, Bt+1 is the nominal value of bonds due next period, and qt is the current-
period price for each nominal unit of bonds due next period.12
If the government is in default, prior debt contracts are no longer honored (i.e.,
Bt = 0), and the debtor country is temporarily excluded from the international





in which they consume everything from their endowment income ydeft . y
def
t denotes
the period endowment income during a default; it is assumed to be a depressed level
of yt because sovereign default imposes output costs on the debtor country.
International investors are risk-neutral. As long as they are compensated with
an expected return at the constant international lending rate rf > 0, they can borrow
or lend as much as they need to.
12A positive Bt+1 means the debtor country saves qtBt+1 in the current period t and receives
Bt+1 in period t+ 1. A negative Bt+1 means the debtor borrows qt (−Bt+1) in the current period,
and pays back, conditioning on non-default, (−Bt+1) in period t+ 1.
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With perfect information on the debtor country income process, investors price
the defaultable bonds in a risk-neutral manner so that they break even in expected
value in every bond contract. Formally, taking bond prices qt as given in every period,
lenders choose loans Bt+1 to maximize expected profits Φt = qtBt+1 − 1−δt+11+rf Bt+1, in
which δt+1 denotes the expected probability of debtor country default in period t+ 1.





The next-period default risk δt+1 is endogenous to the model. It depends on
the government’s incentives to default under different possible yt+1 realizations. In
equilibrium, it is the sum of probabilities for yt+1 realizations in the next period, in




f (yt+1, yt) dyt+1,
in which D(Bt+1) ≡ {yt+1 ∈ Y : government finds it optimal to default on Bt+1}.13
Using the endogenous discount bond price qt, the model defines the interest rate




the credit spread of the defaultable bonds r∆t is defined as r
∆
t ≡ 1qt − (1 + r
f ).
The benevolent government solves a strategic borrowing and default problem on
behalf of households in this economy. Entering each period, it observes its current-
13A formal introduction of D(Bt+1) is deferred until expositions on the government’s strategic
default problem.
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period income yt, and decides whether to repay on its maturing debts Bt. If it does,
it continues to borrow by selling bonds with face value Bt+1 at a unit price of qt, and
rebates all proceeds back to the households in lump-sum transfers. If not, it declares
a default. Maturing debts Bt are ignored but no new bonds could be issued.
Being in default has two consequences in this model — temporary financial ex-
clusion and direct output loss. First of all, the debtor country loses its access to
the international financial market and only re-enters with an exogenous probability
θ ∈ [0, 1) during each subsequent period. Secondly, its output remains at a depressed
level ydeft . y
def
t is assumed to be a concave piecewise liner function with a kink at
a threshold ŷ, which denotes the maximum output level receivable by the debtor
country while it is in default. Formally, ydeft = min{ŷ, yt}.
The government’s strategic borrowing and default problem is outlined below. (For
brevity of notations, I drop all t−subscripts and replace t + 1 notations with ′ vari-
ables.) Entering each period, the government is maximizing its welfare value function
vo (B, y) by choosing between continuing to repay debts vc(B, y) and declaring default
vd(y),
vo (B, y) = max
{vc,vd}
{
vc (B, y) , vd (y)
}
.
The value function of continuing repayments vc (B, y) is
vc (B, y) = max
B′
{
u (y − q (B′, y)B′ +B) + β
∫
y′




and the value function of declaring default vd (y) is








θvo (0, y′) + (1− θ) vd (y′)
]
f (y′, y) dy′.
The choices between vd (y) and vc (B, y) constitute the government’s default policy
set D(B). Formally, D(B) ≡ {y ∈ Y : vd (y) > vc (B, y)}. In correspondence, the
government’s repayment policy set is A(B) ≡ {y ∈ Y : vd (y) ≤ vc (B, y)}.
With the households, the international investors, and the government in place, we
now define the recursive equilibrium in this economy.
Definition. The recursive equilibrium in this economy is formally defined as the
policy functions/sets {ct}+∞0 , D(B), {Bt+1}+∞0 , and market prices {qt}+∞0 such that
1. households maximize their expected lifetime utility subject to their budget con-
straint, taking as given the government policies;
2. the government default policies and borrowing choices satisfy its optimization
problem, taking as given the endogenous prices for their bonds;
3. endogenous bond prices reflect corresponding default probabilities, and are con-
sistent with international investors’ expected zero profits condition,
taking as given the stochastic endowment process {yt}+∞0 .
To be able to use the model for simulations, we first need to solve for its equilib-
rium solutions, using a calibration matched to the simulated empirical episode. For
instance, we now simulate the Argentina 2001 default episode as in Figure I-1.
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First, we start by calibrating the model to Argentina. The goal of the calibration
is to have the model predict an equilibrium sovereign default at about 3% annualized
probability — an observed default probability in Argentina at the annual frequency,
while we assume its income process follows a demeaned log AR(1), ln yt+1 − ¯ln y =
ρ
(
ln yt − ¯ln y
)
+ ηεt+1, in which ¯ln y = ln 10 and εt+1 is a standard white noise. Table
I-1 outlines all parameters for the calibration in its top panel.
Table I-1: Benchmark Calibration & Solution Algorithm Parameters
Variables Parameters Source
Risk-free interest rate rf = 1.7% 5-year U.S. bond quarterly yield
HH risk aversion σ = 2 standard
AR(1) for ln yt+1 ρ = 0.945, η = 0.025 Argentine quarterly GDP
Discount factor β = 0.953 Target 3% default prob.
Prob. of re-entry θ = 0.282 Argentine historical re-entry prob.
Depressed output ŷ = 0.969E (y) ,E(y) = 10 Target 3% default prob.
Grid for B [−3.475, 1.5], equally spaced standard
Grid for y discretized AR(1) Tauchen-Hussey algorithm
No. of grid points for B 200




Default prob. 3.0% Argentine historical default prob.
We then proceed to computationally solve for equilibrium solutions using standard
value function iterations14 on discretized grids. Table I-1 outlines all parameters for
the solution algorithm in its second panel. For brevity of expositions, we plot the
numerical equilibrium solutions in Appendix A2. Overall, these solutions comply with
our intuition in that a higher debtor country income drives lower default probabilities,
which in turn increases bond prices and decreases the country’s cost of borrowing.
14See Appendix A1 for a detailed solution algorithm.
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Table I-2: Benchmark Simulations vs. Data — Argentine Credit Spread
Argentina Model Data
annual conditional default probability 3.09 3.00
mean(r∆annualized) 3.39 10.25
Equipped with these solutions, we can simulate the Argentina bond credit spread
prior to its 2001 default episode at last. To compare with the quarterly time se-
ries data between 1983Q3 and 2001Q4, we simulate the model until it predicts 100
default events, and extract the simulated credit spread over 74 periods just before
each default.15 To demonstrate the low-spread anomaly, we report annualized mean
statistics across these 100 simulated time series together with the data in Table I-2.
B. Introducing Risk-Averse Pricing via the SDF
Framework
To augment the benchmark model with risk-averse pricing, we introduce directly the
investors’ stochastic discount factor (SDF) Mt+1. To accommodate such a change,
the benchmark model requires three changes.
First, endogenous bond prices qt no longer satisfy the risk-neutral pricing equation





15Exactly 74 periods of simulated credit spread are extracted because there are 74 quarters in
the period between 1983Q3 and 2001Q4.
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in which Mt+1 measures how much investors value one unit of next-period consump-
tion in the current period. Intuitively, qt is the sum of discounted future pay-offs
coming from bonds if there is no default.
Second, the risk-free interest rate rft is now time-changing as well. By the same
token, the risk-free interest rate rft satisfies
1 = (1 + rft )
∫
Mt+1f(yt+1, yt)dyt+1,
which intuitively says the current-period risk-free yield has to enable a risk-free pay-off
of one unit of future consumption across all possible states. Subsequently, the credit
spread of defaultable bonds r∆t ≡ 1qt − (1 + r
f
t ) in this framework correspondingly







Third, the exogenous stochastic structure for the economy is now a joint process
between Mt+1 and yt+1















in which E[εyt+1] = E[ε
M




2] = 1. This is assuming
Mt+1 and yt+1 are two independent stochastic processes. Intuitively, this is to say that
the debtor country is too small to affect pricing behaviors on international creditors
in the rest of the world, and the pricing kernel Mt+1 is independent of economic
conditions in the debtor country.
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C. Adapting a Plausible Risk-Averse SDF
To construct a pricing kernel that is arbitrage-free relative to existing bonds in the
market, we follow an algebraic procedure in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005), who use
prices and forward rates on one- through five-year zero coupon U.S. government
bonds.






λTt Σλt − λTt εt+1),
in which t denotes a month, y
(1)
t denotes the log yield of one-year discount bond,
λt, Σ, and εt+1 are mathematical constructs from pre-defined forecasting regressions.
These regressions are specified as














]T and log forward









]T cover maturities and time horizons of





Using the Cochrane-Piazzesi data and procedure, we obtain a monthly-frequency
time series process M∗t+1 that prices annual returns. Adapting it into the benchmark
model requires frequency and pricing horizon adjustments to make it a quarterly-
16Refer to Appendix A3 for more details on the notations here.
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frequency SDF that prices quarterly returns. Theoretically making these adjustments
is no easy task (Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein, 2003); but for our purpose we can
perform some ad-hoc adjustments. To transform from monthly to quarterly frequen-
cies, we take the quarterly average over constituent monthly values; to shift pricing
horizons from a year to a quarter, we modify the SDF so that it approximately “de-
annualizes” an annual risk-free rate into a quarterly yield via the standard pricing
equation 1 = Et[(1 + r
f
t )Mt+1].
17 We sanity-check these adjustments by plotting the
M∗t+1 process before and after in Appendix A5.
Table I-3: Plausible Risk-Averse Pricing Calibration and Simulation
Argentina
Plausible Benchmark






annual conditional default probability 3.01 3.09
mean(r∆annualized) 3.65 3.39
With the adapted M∗t+1 process, we can calibrate, solve, and simulate the model as
before to generate a model-implied Argentine bond credit spread for the years leading
up to the 2001 default episode. Table I-3 outlines the changed calibration parameters
and simulation results. Notably, despite the small improvement on the model-implied
average credit spread from 3.39% to 3.65%, the observed average Argentine bond
credit spread for the same period is 10.25% (Table I-2). The stark contrast in these
17Refer to Appendix A4 for more details on the adjustments here.
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numbers suggest that the low-spread anomaly cannot be resolved by incorporating
risk-averse investors who price risk in a way consistent with the market price of risk
in the data.
To further check on robustness of this conclusion, we perform robustness model
simulations while allowing for potential mis-specifications on the adapted M∗t+1 pro-
cess. The idea is to run model simulations across a wide range of ρM , ηM and M̄
specifications nearby the calibrated one (ρM = 0.710, ηM = 0.012 and M̄ = 0.949)
in Table I-3. We document such checks in Appendix A6; these checks show that our
conclusion is robust in a wide neighboring region from the baseline specification.
D. Summary
This chapter sets out with the question of whether the approach of introducing risk-
averse investors can resolve the low-spread anomaly in structural sovereign default
models, and it answers the question with a No. Upon introducing a risk-averse pricing
kernel in a way that does not allow arbitrage in this market, the model achieves
very minimal success in reconciling its low-spread anomaly as compared with the




The Home Bias of Sovereign
Borrowing
Existing sovereign finance theories are missing a large piece of the jigsaw puzzle in
that they ignore everything about domestic market debt.1 Notably, domestic debt
accounts for an astounding two-thirds of total sovereign borrowing (Reinhart and
Rogoff, 2011a),2 and yet existing theories remain completely agnostic on this and
assume countries only borrow externally (e.g., Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Bulow and
Rogoff, 1989).3 In this chapter, we aim to address this issue by proposing a novel
1Domestic market debt is issued under home legal jurisdiction. In most countries, over most
of their history, it has been denominated in the local currency and held mainly by residents. On
the other hand, external market debt is issued under foreign jurisdictions. It has mainly been
denominated in foreign currencies and held by foreign residents. Note that Reinhart and Rogoff
(2011a) define domestic and external debts in the same way.
2Unearthing archives from the now-defunct League of Nations, Reinhart and Rogoff (2011a) find
that “domestic debt averages almost two-thirds of total public debt” for 64 countries over 1910-2010.
3Earlier literature on sovereign debt and defaults almost all exclusively focus on external
sovereign debt. See Eichengreen (1991) and Tomz and Wright (2013) for a quick survey of this
research.
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sovereign finance theory that incorporates both domestic and external debts.
Incorporating both domestic and external debts into a common framework pro-
vokes many interesting questions. What are the relevant trade-offs between domestic
and external debts when a sovereign needs financing? How does the “home bias”
arise? What is driving the cross-country heterogeneity in it? It is especially intrigu-
ing to think about the home bias from a risk-sharing perspective — domestic debt
is much less useful than external debt for hedging macroeconomic income risks, and
yet governments are borrowing nearly two-thirds of their debts domestically.
To answer these questions, chapter 2 develops a novel general equilibrium model,
in which the benevolent government can strategically choose to borrow from domestic
or external markets.4 Under reasonable assumptions and calibrations, the home bias
of sovereign borrowing naturally emerges in this model as an equilibrium outcome
through the government’s strategic financing behaviors.
We are the first to model a domestic market explicitly apart from an external
market in sovereign debt models. To hedge its inter-temporal income risks, the gov-
ernment borrows from households and residing foreigners on the domestic market,
whereas it only borrows from non-resident foreigners on the external market. More
importantly, the government can choose to default on either market selectively. We
base such a set-up on empirical observations, which we discuss more in the next
section.
Given this set-up, the government tends to prioritize its borrowing from the do-
4One implicit assumption here is that the sovereign is free to choose either domestic or external
markets to finance its debts. Historically, however, a sovereign sometimes loses this freedom as a
result of war resolutions. Analysis in this chapter would not apply in such situations.
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mestic market, since the government finds it cheaper, ceteris paribus, to borrow do-
mestically than externally. The government, if it had to, prefers an external default
than a domestic default as it tries to avoid hurting households.5 In general equi-
librium, all investors realize that and demand lower yields on domestic debt than
external debt.
However, the government does not want to borrow only from the domestic market
because only a limited amount of foreign capital is available for its hedging needs.
Most of the domestic debt is borrowing from households, which is merely an internal
transfer of wealth that does not improve the country-level budget constraint. If the
government needs foreign capital beyond what is available on the domestic market,
it accesses the external market for external debt.
By introducing a capital control constraint on foreign investments within the
domestic market, the model implies that looser inflow capital controls for a country
are associated with a stronger home bias in its sovereign borrowing. In the model,
this happens because looser inflow capital controls allow more foreign capital into
the domestic market, and hence the government has less need to supplement its
hedging needs with external debt. Using a dataset that spans 58 countries over 1996-
2010, chapter 2 runs a controlled long-run average regression and shows that this
relationship is indeed borne out in the data.
This chapter organizes itself as follows. Section A discusses the empirical grounds
5That is, however, not to say that domestic defaults never occur in precedence to external
defaults in the model. In fact, under certain conditions, the government in the model would choose
domestic defaults over external defaults. This observation is also in line with empirical recounts of
historical sovereign defaults in the next section.
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for building a theory of selective defaults between two separate debt markets. Sec-
tion B presents a novel general equilibrium sovereign debt model with two markets
and demonstrates how the home bias of sovereign borrowing could arise as an equi-
librium outcome in this model. Section C documents empirical evidence supporting
the model-implied relationship that looser inflow capital controls for a country are
associated with a stronger home bias in its sovereign borrowing. Finally, section D
concludes the chapter.
A. Empirical Grounds for A Theory of Selective
Defaults
Selective defaults are only meaningful when the appropriate definition is used to
define domestic and external market debts.6 Due to the legal nature of a post-default
resolution process, we use the contractual markets of jurisdiction as our definition7
— that is where the bond contracts are issued and hence under what laws these
contracts are governed should later disputes arise.8 Under this definition, selective
6For instance, selective defaults are impossible under the citizenship of ownership definition —
that is to say, it is practically impossible for the government to selectively default on debts held
by foreigners while to repay on debts held by domestic households because foreigners could always
sell defaulted bonds to domestic households to retrieve remaining values. Previous works such as
Guembel and Sussman (2009), Broner, Martin, and Ventura (2010), Broner and Ventura (2011),
and Perez (2015) have repeatedly emphasized this point.
7Besides the markets of jurisdiction definition, other definitions that have been used to distin-
guish domestic from external debts include currency denominations and citizenship of ownership.
See Du and Schreger (2016ab) for examples using the currency denomination definition, and Ar-
slanalp and Tsuda (2014ab) for examples using the ownership citizenship definition. Refer to Panizza
(2008) for a discussion on similarities and differences for using different definitions.
8For instance, a U.S. dollar-denominated Argentine bond issued in New York under the U.S. law
held by Argentine institutional investors would constitute external market debt for the Argentina
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Source: Self-computations based on
              Reinhart and Rogoff (AER,2011)
defaults are pragmatically feasible because domestic and external market debts are
treated separately according to their respective legal jurisdictions in the case of a
default.9
Not only are they possible, selective defaults have in fact happened frequently
over time. In Figure II-1 at its left panel, we plot summary statistics from a sample
of all de jure sovereign default episodes (i.e., outright non-payments and involuntary
restructuring) across 70 countries over 210 years. 93% of all sovereign default episodes
government; an RMB-denominated Chinese bond issued in Shanghai under the Chinese law held by
a U.S. mutual fund would be considered domestic market debt for the Chinese government.
9See the recent Argentina bond default episode, in which the British-law, New York-law,
Japanese-law and Argentine-law governed Argentine bonds each receive a different outcome as the
process unfolds. Source: “The Muddled Case of Argentina Bonds”, New York Times, Jul 24, 2014.
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in the sample are selective (i.e., 14% of domestic only and 79% of external only).10
Such a high probability is partially driven by improper accounting — we count it as a
selective default when a country explicitly defaults on its external debt and implicitly
defaults on its domestic debt via hyper-inflations. To account for de facto defaults
beyond the de jure ones, we plot these summary statistics again in Appendix A7 with
additional considerations for hyper-inflations. Despite some changes in numbers, the
key idea that selective defaults are frequent phenomena remains compelling across
different specifications.
Furthermore, Figure II-1 also shows that external defaults seem much more likely
than domestic defaults. Over 1800-2010, 85% of the sovereign defaults involve ex-
ternal markets (i.e., 79% of external only and 6% of twin defaults) while only 20%
involve domestic markets (i.e., 14% of domestic only and 6% of twin defaults). To
ensure this is not just driven by a few outlier countries but more of a general phe-
nomenon, we plot similar statistics at the country level in Appendix A8 and conclude
that external defaults are indeed more likely than domestic defaults across countries.
Overall, this suggests that any theory of selective defaults should be able to account
for this phenomenon, and fortunately our model is able to achieve this as well.
10We also plot summary statistics using a sub-sample over 1960-2010 at the right panel in Figure
II-1; the message stays strikingly consistent no matter which time frame we look at within the
sample.
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B. A Sovereign Debt Model with Two Markets
In this section we outline a novel general equilibrium sovereign debt model, in which
the benevolent government can strategically choose to borrow from domestic or ex-
ternal markets. We assume that the government borrows from both households and
residing foreigners on its domestic market, whereas it borrows only from non-resident
foreigners on its external market. The government cannot commit to repay its debts
ex-post on both markets per Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), but it can choose to selec-
tively default on either market.
Households solve an inter-temporal consumption problem. Their representative
agent receives a Markov stochastic stream of endowments yt > 0 that follows a tran-
sition function f(yt+1, yt) and has compact support Y . Its objective is to maximize
its expected lifetime utility, and in doing so, it chooses its private goods consumption






βtE0 [u (ct, gt)] ,
subject to their inter-temporal budget constraint that takes shape after the govern-
ment makes its borrowing and default decisions each period. β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the
households’ subjective period discount factor. u(ct, gt) denotes the households’ period
utility function. It takes a standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
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in which σ is the coefficient of risk aversion for households, sc is the share param-
eter, and ρ governs the degree of substitutability between private and public goods
consumption. ρ < 1 so that private and public goods are not perfect substitutes.11
At the same time, households act as bond investors on the domestic market. They
invest by purchasing one-period discount bonds issued by the government within the
domestic market. If the government keeps honoring its domestic debt, households’







t + yt(1− τ),
in which τ denotes the income tax rate, bdht denotes the nominal value of previously
purchased bonds households can redeem in period t, bdht+1 denotes the nominal value
of bonds redeemable next period, and qdt denotes the current-period price for each
nominal unit of domestic bonds maturing next period.
If the government declares a default on its domestic market, prior domestic bonds
are no longer honored, and the government is temporarily excluded from the do-





in which they consume everything from their post-tax endowment income ydeft (1−τ).
ydeft denotes the period endowment income during a default; it is assumed to be a
11This is a reasonable assumption given the relevant empirical work on public and private con-
sumption substitutability. See, for example, Kwan (2006).
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depressed level of yt, depending on the exact default status on the two markets.
Foreign investors reside on both domestic and external markets so they invest
on both domestic and external bonds. However, they are subject to a capital control
constraint on the domestic market: only a limited entry of foreign investments is
allowed into the domestic domain. Formally,
bdft+1 ≤ γbdht+1,∀t,
in which bdft+1 denotes the nominal value of domestic bonds purchased by foreign
investors in period t, and γ ∈ [0,+∞) governs the degree of domestic capital controls.
If γ = 0, the domestic market is completely shut off to foreign investors; if γ = +∞,
the domestic market imposes no constraints over foreign investors.
Foreign investors are risk-neutral, and they are willing to borrow or lend as much
as they need to, as long as they are compensated with an expected return of the
constant international risk-free lending rate rf > 0.
With perfect information on the debtor country income process, foreign investors
price the defaultable bonds in a risk-neutral manner so that they break even in
expected value in every bond contract. However, since domestic and external bonds
have different default probabilities, this requires domestic bond prices qdt and external









in which δdt+1, δ
e
t+1 respectively denote the expected probabilities of debtor country
default in period t+ 1 on domestic and external markets.
The next-period default risks δdt+1, δ
e
t+1 are endogenous to the model. They depend
on the government’s incentives to default domestically or externally under different
possible yt+1 realizations. In equilibrium, they are sums of probabilities for yt+1
realizations in the next period, in which the government finds it optimal to default



























t+1) ≡ {yt+1 ∈ Y : government chooses an external default}.12
The benevolent government solves a strategic borrowing and default problem
in this economy. Entering each period, it receives its current-period tax income τyt,
provides public goods consumption gt for households, and decides whether to repay




t ). If it does, it continues to









If not, it declares a default on its domestic debt, or its external debt, or both. Ma-
turing debts within the markets in default are ignored, but no new bonds could be
issued in the respective markets. The general inter-temporal budget constraint for

















Defaulting on either market has two consequences — temporary financial exclusion










t+1) are deferred until ex-
positions on the government’s strategic default problem.
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and direct output loss. The debtor country loses its access to the respective debt
market and only regains access with exogenous probabilities (θd, θe ∈ [0, 1)) during
each subsequent period. For as long as the debtor country is in default of either
market, its output remains at a depressed level ydef . Depressed output level ydeft is
assumed to be a concave piecewise liner function with a kink at a variable threshold
ŷ, depending on specific default status of the debtor country. Formally,




ωeȳ, if external default only
ωdȳ, if domestic default only
ωeωdȳ, if twin default
and ȳ denotes the long-run average of yt.
Formally, the government’s strategic borrowing and default problem is outlined
below. (For brevity of notations, I drop all t-subscripts and replace t+1notations with
’ variables.) Entering each period, the government is maximizing its welfare value
function V o(bdh, bdf , Be, y) by choosing among repaying all debts V r(bdh, bdf , Be, y),
defaulting domestically V d(Be, y), defaulting externally V e(bdh, bdf , y), and defaulting
on both markets V b(y),
V o(bdh, bdf , Be, y) = max
V r,V d,V e,V b
{




Specifically, the value function of repaying all debts V r(bdh, bdf , Be, y) is
V r(bdh, bdf , Be, y) = max














The value function of being in domestic default V d(Be, y) is




















The value function of being in external default V e(bdh, bdf , y) is
























The value function of being in default on both markets V b(y) is




θdθeV o(0, 0, 0, y′) + θd(1− θe)V e(0, 0, y′)
+(1− θd)θeV d(0, y′) + (1− θd)(1− θe)V b(y′)
]
f(y′, y)dy′.
The choices among V r, V d, V e, V b constitute the government’s default policy sets
for the domestic market (DD(bdh, bdf , Be)) and the external market (ED(bdh, bdf , Be)).
Formally,
DD(bdh, bdf , Be) ≡
{





ED(bdh, bdf , Be) ≡
{
y ∈ Y : max{V r, V d, V e, V b} ∈ {V e, V b}
}
.
With the households, the foreign investors, and the government in place, we now
define the recursive equilibrium in this economy.
Definition. The recursive equilibrium in this economy is formally defined as the
policy functions/sets {ct}+∞0 , {gt}+∞0 , DD(bdh, bdf , Be), ED(bdh, bdf , Be), {bdht+1}+∞0 ,
{bdft+1}+∞0 , {Bet+1}+∞0 , and market prices {qdt }+∞0 , {qet }+∞0 such that
1. households maximize their expected lifetime utility subject to their budget con-
straint, taking as given the government default policies and public goods provi-
sions;
2. the government default policies and borrowing choices satisfy its optimization
problem, taking as given the endogenous prices for both domestic and external
bonds issued;
3. endogenous bond prices reflect corresponding default probabilities in respective
market, and are consistent with foreign investors’ expected zero profits condition;
4. domestic market bond holdings between households and residing foreigners sat-
isfy the capital control constraint,
taking as given the stochastic endowment process {yt}+∞0 .
To demonstrate how a home bias of sovereign borrowing can arise as an equilibrium
outcome in the model, we computationally solve for equilibrium solutions using a
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counterfactual calibration. The goal of this calibration is not to match to any specific
economy; instead, it is meant to show how the “home bias” of sovereign borrowing
can occur in such a model under reasonable assumptions and calibrations to that of
a “typical” emerging market economy.
Table II-1: Model Counterfactual Calibration Parameters
Variables Calibration Benchmark
Discount factor β = 0.98 assumption
HH risk aversion σ = 2 assumption
Elasticity of substitution ρ = 0.6 assumption
Risk-free interest rate rf = 1.23% quarterly yield of 5% per annum
HH income tax rate τ = 0.3 assumption
Depressed output ωe = 0.97, ωd = 0.91 Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b)
Prob. of re-entry θe = 5%, θd = 13% Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b)
Capital control tightness γ 0.3 assumption
Stochastic process for yt log AR(1) Arellano (2008)
Table II-1 outlines all parameters for the counterfactual calibration. Using this set
of calibration parameters, I computationally solve for the recursive equilibrium using
standard value function iterations13 on discretized grids. In Figure II-2, we plot the
numerical equilibrium solutions for discount bond prices on both markets at mean
output level ȳ, while assuming debt levels on the other market are zero. Intuitively,
this is shutting off one debt market while relying on the other so that we can compare
domestic and external market debt in a ceteris paribus manner.
Figure II-2 demonstrates two desirable features of the model equilibrium in tan-
dem. First, external defaults are more likely than domestic defaults at equilibrium,
which is seen from qe “dipping” earlier than qd in the plot. At B < 0.02, qd and qe
13See Appendix A9 for details on the solution algorithm.
33
Figure II-2: Equilibrium Bond Prices qd, qe at Mean Output ȳ
(Solid Line — qe, Dashed Line — qd)













Equilibrium Discount Rates of Sovereign Bonds at Mean Output
(Domestic Market Only qd vs. International Market Only qf)
qf
qd
both plateau at 1
1+rf
since there is no perceivable default risk yet on both markets
at such low levels of debt. However, at 0.02 < B < 0.028, more debt is borrowed on
both markets, and qe tanks to reflect the increased default risk while qd still plateaus
at 1
1+rf
. In fact, at any point within 0.02 < B < 0.045, external default risk is always
higher than domestic default risk for a given debt level. This corresponds well with
earlier empirical observation in that external defaults are historically more likely than
domestic defaults for a given country.
Second, domestic debt is always cheaper — if not equal — to borrow than external
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debt when borrowing an identical amount of debt on either market. At all debt levels
in the plot, qe has always been beneath — if not equal to — qd, and this means the
cost of borrowing for a given amount of debt is lower on the domestic market than
the external market, ceteris paribus. As the government prioritizes domestic debt to
lower its costs of financing, the model generates the observed “home bias” in sovereign
borrowing.
C. Relationship between Capital Control
Measures and Home Bias of Sovereign
Borrowing
The model implies a relationship between a country’s capital control measures and its
home bias of sovereign borrowing through the constraint bdft+1 ≤ γbdht+1. In the model,
a higher γ allows more foreign capital bdft+1 on the domestic market, and hence the
government has less need to supplement its hedging needs with external debt. As a
result, the degree of home bias in sovereign borrowing is stronger. But empirically,
is this borne out in the data?
To test out this relationship in the data, we compile a cross-country dataset that
spans 58 countries over 1996-2010 and run a multivariate cross-sectional regression
using long-run averages.14 We formally specify the regression below, and summarize
14Alternatively we could have run a panel regression using this dataset. However, it would largely
be the same as a cross-sectional regression using long-run averages. This is because capital control
measures are rarely changing over years for most countries and the panel regression would have
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its full results in Table II-2. As a quick preview, these results show that looser inflow
capital control measures on the domestic market are indeed associated with a stronger
home bias in the sovereign borrowing of a country.
Specification (Multivariate Cross-country Test using Long-run Averages).
dSharei = β0 + βcnetInflowi + Xi + µi,
in which i denotes a country, dSharei measures its degree of home bias in sovereign
borrowing, netInflowi measures its degree of financial openness to net capital inflows
on the domestic market, and Xi denotes all other controls including the rule of law
index, the total sovereign debt to GDP ratio, the real gross domestic product, the real
GDP per capita, the gross savings to GDP ratio, the annualized inflation rate, the
current account balance to GDP ratio and the annualized average GDP growth.
We construct the degree of home bias dSharei using the sample average of annual
domestic/total debt shares for country i over 1996-2010, adjusted into a common






country i’s outstanding domestic debt in $ at year t
country i’s outstanding total debt in $ at year t
.
To construct these domestic debt shares, we use data from Reinhart and Rogoff
(2011a), cross checked and supplemented with data from Cowan et al (2006), Guscina
and Jeanne (2006), and Panizza (2008).
almost no intra-country inter-temporal variations in its independent variable.
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Table II-2: Regressions of Domestic Debt Shares on netInflow Openness





































































n 56 58 56 56
R2 0.727 0.691 0.647 0.644
F 24.11 62.27 19.16 25.47
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: All ratios (including inflation and GDP growth) are in decimals. All variables for each country
are inter-temporal averages over 1996-2010, in which inflation, GDP growth are computed using annualized
averages while the rest are simple arithmetic means. All GDP data are deflated to 2010 US$, in which GDP
are in quadrillions US$ while GDP/capita are in millions US$.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates; * is significant at 10%,
** is significant at 5% and *** is significant at 1%.
We construct the financial openness index netInflowi using more primitive re-
striction indices developed by FKRSU-2016 (Fernandez, Klein, Rebucci, Schindler
& Uribe, 2016).15 To develop quantitative measures on capital control policies, they
encode textual policy descriptions from IMF AREAER reports16 into numeric indices
15This paper has a few earlier editions in the same spirit including Schindler (2009), Klein (2012),
and Fernandez, Klein & Uribe (2015).
16IMF AREAER (i.e., International Monetary Fund Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements
and Exchange Restrictions) reports are frequently used as primary sources of capital control policies
37
∈ [0, 1] that measure capital control restriction intensities on both inflows and out-
flows of different cross-border transaction types. To construct netInflowi, we use
average financial openness for capital inflows less average financial openness for capi-
tal outflows, specifically on money market transactions, bond transactions, derivative













in which i, t denotes a country-year, inflowi,t =
1
4
[(1 −mmii,t) + (1 − boii,t) + (1 −
deii,t)+(1−fcii,t)], outflowi,t = 14 [(1−mmoi,t)+(1−booi,t)+(1−deoi,t)+(1−fcoi,t)],
and mmii,t, mmoi,t, boii,t, booi,t, deii,t, deoi,t, fcii,t, fcoi,t are primitive restriction
indices on specific transaction type inflows/outflows taken from FKRSU-2016.18
Among all other controls we include a rule of law index that is taken from the
Worldwide Governance Indicators. It is included to control for heterogeneity in home
bias of sovereign borrowing that arises directly from differences in legal environments
between home and abroad. All macroeconomic controls are constructed using data
from IMF WEO database.19 These are in place to account for cross-country differ-
for developing quantitative measures. Earlier works include Quinn (1997, 2011) and Chinn and Ito
(2006, 2008).
17These transaction categories are specifically chosen so that they cover all potential methods
of foreign investments on domestic sovereign bonds. This is because foreign investors residing do-
mestically could potentially invest on domestic sovereign bonds through money market instruments,
directly on bonds, indirectly through derivatives, or borrowing from banks to invest.
18Specifically, mmii,t, mmoi,t are on money market investment inflows/outflows, boii,t, booi,t are
on bond investment inflows/outflows, deii,t, deoi,t are on derivative investment inflows/outflows,
and fcii,t, fcoi,t are on financial credit inflows/outflows.
19We use the October 2016 version of IMF WEO database (i.e., International Monetary Fund
World Economic Outlook).
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ences in macroeconomic conditions.
According to the model, we expect βc in the regression to be positive. Table
II-2 display β̂c estimates in bold at the first row from the top, and they are indeed
positive and statistically significant. Across different columns in Table II-2, we also
run slightly different specifications of the baseline regression. This is to sanity-check
on robustness of the regression results conditioning on including different controls in
the regressions. Overall, the relationship that looser inflow capital control measures
are associated with stronger home biases remains present and statistically significant
across different specifications.
D. Summary
This chapter sets out with the goal of incorporating domestic debt into sovereign
finance theories. In doing so, it proposes a novel general equilibrium sovereign debt
model, in which the benevolent government can strategically choose to borrow from
the domestic or external markets. Under reasonable assumptions and calibrations,
the observed home bias of sovereign borrowing naturally emerges in the model as
an equilibrium outcome through the government’s strategic financing behaviors. Fi-
nally, this chapter also presents some cross-country evidence for the model-implied
relationship that looser inflow capital control measures for a country are associated
with a stronger home bias in its sovereign borrowing.
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Chapter III.
The Financial Channel of
Economic Agglomeration
Economic activities tend to agglomerate in space.1 For instance, nearly a third of all
U.S. economic activities take place within merely 1% of total land area in the coun-
try.2 How does economic agglomeration arise in those areas?3 An understanding of
underlying economic forces is crucial because it can guide developments and growths
elsewhere.
1We map economic activities using locations of firms/establishments as in Ellison, Glaeser, and
Kerr (2010). Others, such as Davis and Weinstein (2002) and Gabaix et al. (2011), have used the
spatial distribution of the population.
2The 100 densest counties by the number of establishments per unit land area accounts for 32%
of all establishments in the U.S. economy and 1% of total land area in the country. The U.S. Census
Bureau defines an establishment as “a single physical location where business is conducted or where
services or industrial operations are performed.” See Appendix A10 for a map of U.S. economic
density at the county-level.
3While natural advantages and random chances partly contribute to the economic prosperity in
those areas, they hardly represent the whole story (Ellison and Glaeser, 1997, 1999; Duranton and
Oveman, 2005). In this case, “natural advantages” are defined broadly as in Ellison and Glaeser
(1999). One example is the relatively low electricity prices in Washington as a “natural advantage”
for economic productions.
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Traditionally, urban economists interpret economic agglomeration as an outcome
of firms choosing to locate near each other, because doing so begets increasing returns
to scale in their productions.4 To explain economic agglomeration, these theories
show that firms would endogenously choose to move near each other in a spatial
equilibrium, when production factors (especially labor) are perfectly mobile (Glaeser
and Gottlieb, 2009). However, sometimes moving costs, in reality, are likely so large
that any mobility becomes impossible to achieve.5
Alternatively, chapter 3 explores the possibility of explaining economic agglom-
eration from a novel financial perspective — the financial channel of economic ag-
glomeration. The basic idea posits that firms would more likely emerge together
near banks due to less stringent financial frictions in obtaining bank loans, and firms
subsequently agglomerate in these areas as they grow over time.6
4Such increasing returns could come from savings in trade costs (e.g., Krugman, 1991b; Allen and
Arkolakis, 2014), labor-market pooling (e.g., Krugman 1991a; Strange et al., 2006), or knowledge
spillovers (e.g., Duranton and Puga, 2001; Davis and Dingles, 2019). The original ideas of savings in
trade costs, labor-market pooling, and knowledge spillovers all date back to Marshall (1890, 1920),
and all three theories have considerable empirical support (Ellison, Glaeser and Kerr, 2010). Other
important earlier works about savings in trade costs include Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999);
works about labor-market pooling include Diamond and Simon (1990), Helsley and Strange (1990),
Costa and Kahn (2000), Fallick, Fleischman and Rebitzer (2006), Freedman (2008); works about
knowledge spillovers include Glaeser et al (1992), Audretsch and Feldman (1996), Glaeser and Mare
(2001), Lucas (2001), Berliant, Peng and Wang (2002), Henderson (2003), Helsley and Strange
(2004), Moretti (2004), Berliant, Reed III and Wang (2006), and Freedman (2008). See Glaeser and
Gottlieb (2009) for a quick tour of the intellectual lineage, and Duranton and Puga (2004), Moretti
(2011) for more surveys of the related literature.
5Rauch (1993) has theoretically demonstrated how strategic complementarity could create a first-
mover disadvantage that prevents any relocation of firms. A recent strand of empirical literature
(Bryan, Chowdhury and Mobarak, 2014; Chetty, Hendren and Katz, 2016; Munshi and Rosen-
zweig, 2016; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018; Bryan and Morten, forthcoming) looks at economic
consequences of moving for people and concludes that moving costs — arising from informational,
cultural, legal, and economic barriers — of labor must be so substantial that people are often “stuck”
in locations that do not fully realize their economic potentials.
6Duranton and Kerr (2015) are the first to discuss financial frictions being potentially important
for understanding economic agglomeration.
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Such a channel is theoretically feasible, given what we have learned from existing
research. First, firms could indeed more likely emerge due to less stringent finan-
cial frictions because entrepreneurship requires external financing, and the ability to
borrow is vital for firm formations (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989). Second, financial
frictions could be less stringent near banks because a shorter borrower-lender distance
does improve lending terms in bank loans (Mian, 2006; Bolton et al, 2016).7 And
third, frictions in obtaining bank loans could really matter because the average U.S.
firm heavily relies on bank loans for external financing (Peterson and Rajan, 2002).
However, whether such a channel exists in the data is a difficult empirical question.
Merely observing more firms locate near banks in the cross-section8 is insufficient for
at least two reasons. First, there could be omitted variable biases in that firms and
banks can collocate for reasons unrelated to borrowing and lending (Fujita and Mori,
1996; Ellison and Glaeser, 1999; Davis and Weinstein, 2002).9 Second, there could
be reverse causality in that banks posteriorly locate themselves in places where firms
already agglomerate.10
To show that a bank can indeed cause firms to agglomerate in its proximity by
easing their financial frictions, chapter 3 designs a natural experiment by exploiting
7The distance effects could come from a variety of microeconomic mechanisms, such as less
costly monitoring (Rajan, 1992; Von Thadden, 1995), better information acquisition (Agarwal and
Hauswald, 2010; Puri et al., 2010), and less severe principal-agent problem (Stein, 2002).
8See Appendix A10 for a cross-sectional plot observing more firms locate near banks.
9Historical narratives have also emphasized the importance of inherent natural advantages in
the rise of well-known metropolises such as New York City, Chicago, and Pittsburgh. See Albion
(1938) and Cronon (1991) for more details.
10Anecdotal evidence suggests that banks indeed relocate themselves to “chase the crowd.”
See, for example, “Bank of Commerce Holdings Announces Relocation of Headquarters” (Globe
Newswire, 2017a) and “First U.S. Bancshares, Inc. Announces Relocation of Headquarters to Birm-
ingham” (Globe Newswire, 2017b).
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the sudden location change on the target bank after each banking merger — in that
the target bank suddenly “relocates” (through merging) to the acquiring bank. The
intuition is to see what a quasi-exogenous relocation of a bank closer to a region does
to the region’s total loan supplies and subsequent establishment growths. A standard
difference-in-difference (Diff-in-Diff) approach shows that relocation of a bank closer
to a region indeed causes more supply of bank loans in that region, and subsequently
causes more firm establishments to emerge and agglomerate within the same area.11
Two major identifying assumptions have to hold for this strategy to be successful.
First, absent the treatment, outcomes at the “treated” regions would evolve similarly
as those of the “control” regions, and one necessary condition for this assumption to
hold is the so-called “parallel pre-trend” — trends in outcome variables between the
two groups are parallel at least before the treatment. We can validate this condition
using our data. Second, no other shocks are happening at the same time of treatment
that could potentially affect the outcome variables. To alleviate this concern, we
include additional controls to proxy for such shocks in our regression specifications.
This chapter organizes itself as follows. Section A discusses the identification
strategy in detail. Section B briefly outlines the data sources we use as well as the
sample construction process. Section C formally spells out the Diff-in-Diff specifica-
tion. Section D validates the parallel pre-trend condition. Section E presents the full
set of regression results. Finally, section F concludes the chapter.
11Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) study how having nearby banks could help local economic
growth through promoting entrepreneurship in Italy. In some way, this chapter studies an analog of
that question in the context of the U.S.
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A. Identification Strategy
To identify if a bank can indeed cause firms to agglomerate within its proximity by
easing their financial frictions in obtaining loans, we design a natural experiment
that resembles a hypothetical randomized controlled trial. In such a trial, we would
first want to exogenously move a bank closer to or away from its lending areas while
controlling for other factors, and then examine consequences on total loan supplies
and subsequent firm/establishment growths within the same areas.
Correspondingly, the natural experiment generates a quasi-exogenous bank relo-
cation, by exploiting the sudden location change of the target bank after a banking
merger. As the target bank suddenly “relocates” (through merging) to the acquiring
bank, we examine loan and firm/establishment outcome changes within the target
bank lending areas, which can become closer to or farther away from the bank after
the merger. To maximally control for other factors during this process, we develop a
procedure that carefully isolates the “relocation shock” from other things happening
at the same time as the merger. To do so, we proceed in three steps.
First, we compile a list of large-scale banking mergers over 1998-2015 as events
generating the relocation shocks, in which each merger gives us one natural experi-
ment.12 In this case, large-scale banking mergers are those with individual pre-merger
total assets above $1 billion from both merging banks. We only look at these merg-
ers to reduce concerns of reverse causality — since it is unlikely that local loan and
firm/establishment outcome changes are driving merger decisions in deals of such
12We perform repeated natural experiments using a pooled sample, as in Greenstone, Hornbeck,
and Moretti (2010).
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sizes. This tactic has been used by Nguyen (2019) to alleviate reverse causality con-
cerns.
Second, we sample all de novo counties associated with each merger and use each
county as a controlled environment, in which we later examine outcomes of different
ZIP-code areas. We define de novo counties as counties in which only the target
bank (out of the merging banks) had full-service deposit-taking branches before the
merger.13 In these counties, the merger does not create market structure changes
in the local banking markets.14 Furthermore, regulations keep existing target bank
branches intact after the merger. These features help us maximally control for other
things happening at the same time as the merger within the natural experiment.15
Finally, within each de novo county from the sample, we examine total bank loan
originations and firm/establishment growths across different ZIP-code areas. We use
a Census-defined ZIP Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA) as a unit of observation for
ZIP-code areas,16 and we coarsely define a ZCTA as a lending area for a bank if
the bank has full-service deposit-taking branches within the ZCTA. Following these
definitions, we consider the target bank lending ZCTAs within each de novo county
13We name these counties as “de novo” from the perspective of the acquirer because it is through
a particular merger the acquiring bank first enters these counties. In Appendix A11, we illustrate
the concept of de novo counties using an example.
14In local banking markets within these counties, no consolidation occurs as the acquiring bank
takes the place of the target bank after the merger. In other counties where both the target and the
acquiring banks were present before the merger, consolidation occurs, and the acquiring bank has a
much higher market power after the merger.
15U.S. regulations require that all merging banks commit to maintain existing services at com-
munities which the non-surviving bank has previously provided. In de novo counties, the acquiring
bank typically maintains the target bank’s existing branches together with all their prior services
and local banking relationships. In other counties, branch closures frequently occur after the merger
if the acquiring bank already has incumbent branches before the merger.
16A ZIP Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA) is a collection of contiguous Census blocks that consoli-
date nearby areas of similar ZIP codes.
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as the “treated” areas and all other ZCTAs as the “control” areas in the natural
experiment.
Using a standard difference-in-difference (Diff-in-Diff) approach to compare out-
comes across “treated” and “control” ZCTAs before and after each merger, we can
then identify if a quasi-exogenous relocation of a bank indeed affects total loan sup-
plies and firm/establishment growths within its lending area. We use strong fixed
effects to ensure we only compare across ZCTAs within each de novo county from a
particular merger. We discuss the formal regression specification in a later section.
B. Data Sources and Sample Construction
To carry out the identification strategy outlined above, we need several sources of
information on the U.S., including data on banking mergers, data on bank branch
spatial networks, disaggregate data on total bank loan originations by region, and
disaggregate data on establishment growths by region.
Information on U.S. banking mergers is available from the Mergers and Acquisi-
tions dataset by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (FRB Chicago) through the
National Information Center (NIC). Per U.S. banking regulations, all mergers have
to be reported to and approved by the Federal Reserve System. As such, this dataset
contains information “that can be used to identify all bank and bank holding com-
pany (BHC) acquisitions and mergers that have occurred since 1976” (FRB Chicago).
Merging it with the standard Call Reports at the bank-level, we can then shortlist all
U.S. banking mergers from 1998 - 2015 that have pre-merger individual total assets
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above $1 billion. We start from 1998 in our sample because the Riegle-Neal Act that
enables complete inter-state banking mergers only went into effect in June 1997.
Geospatial information on bank-branch networks comes from the Summary of De-
posits (SOD) dataset compiled by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
The SOD is, per the FDIC websites, “[a required] annual survey of branch office de-
posits as of June 30 for all FDIC-insured institutions, including insured U.S. branches
of foreign banks.” In other words, we can use it to locate all full-service deposit-taking
branches of any commercial bank to the ZIP-code level. This information is crucial
for sampling de novo counties as well as designating “treated” and “control” ZCTAs
within each county.
Disaggregate data on total bank loan originations by region are available at the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) through the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) enacted in 1977. Per CRA regulatory requirements, all U.S.
commercial banks above a threshold in total assets are required to report their annual
business loan originations to FFIEC for compliance assessments.17 Aggregating this
information across banks, the FFIEC creates a dataset at the Census-tract level, and
it contains annual total bank loan originations (in both quantities and dollar amounts)
to all firms having less than $1 million annual revenues within a Census-tract.
Disaggregate data on establishment growths by region are from the County Busi-
ness Patterns (CBP) dataset developed from the Longitudinal Business Data (LBD)
database by the U.S. Census Bureau. It contains establishment-level information on
17This threshold is approximately $1 billion and it is slightly adjusted every year to account for
general inflations. In 2010, “the asset size threshold that triggers data collection and reporting for
all agencies is $1.098 billion as of December 31 of each of the prior two calendar years” (FFIEC).
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employment counts, payroll amounts, industry classification, and ZIP codes.
In our regression specification, we also include other controls on natural geogra-
phies (i.e., local weather and land cover information) and demographic characteristics
(i.e., population size, urban ratio, household income level, labor force participation
ratio, and housing vacancy ratio). These controls are in place so that we can elimi-
nate regional heterogeneities in total bank loan supplies and subsequent establishment
growths that are coming from natural advantages.
Data on natural geographies are from the National Land Cover Database (NLCD)
and the PRISM Climate Database (PRISM CD). The NLCD provides a Census-tract
level land area together with a characterizing vector of proportions for different land
cover types (e.g., open water and grassland) once every five years (i.e., 2001, 2006,
and 2011). The PRISM CD provides a county-level mean and standard deviation of
year-round precipitations and temperatures once every year. Data on demographic
characteristics are from the decennial U.S. Census of 1990, 2000, and 2010, and they
contain information on essential demographics at the ZIP-code level.
While merging different datasets outlined above, we have to deal with different
geographic units and time frequencies frequently. We use the 2010 Reference Files
published by the U.S. Census Bureau to map across different geographic units (e.g.,
from Census-tracts to ZCTAs, and vice versa). To match across different time fre-
quencies (e.g., matching decennial Census data to annual establishment counts data),
we use the last updated observation from datasets with lower time frequencies to fill
gaps in datasets with higher time frequencies until the next available value — for
example, we use 2000 Census observation for 2000-2009 and use 2010 Census obser-
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vation for 2010 and above in our constructed sample.
Table III-1: Sample Summary Statistics
No. of States 43
No. of Counties 842
%. of Treated ZCTAs 22.7%
No. of Mergers 84
No. of ZCTA-Year Observations 17,597
Upon merging different datasets, we obtain a pooled cross-sectional sample of de
novo counties together with their respective “treated” and “control” ZCTAs from
1998-2015. Table III-1 presents the sample summary statistics. The sample seems
reasonably representative of the U.S. economic landscape as it spans a wide range of
geographic locations in the country.
C. Diff-in-Diff Regression Specification
We employ a continuous treatment Diff-in-Diff regression specification using the “re-
location distance” (∆distancei) as the treatment intensity for a “treated” ZCTA i.
Formally,
∆distancei = distance(ZCTA i, acquiring bank)
− distance(ZCTA i, target bank),
in which distance(A,B) denotes the great-circle distance between locations of A and
B. Intuitively, ∆distancei > 0 means the target bank has “relocated” farther away
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from its lending ZCTA i after the merger. For “control” ZCTAs within each de novo
county, ∆distancei ≡ 0.
Also, we include a “size shock” (∆sizei) as an additional control in the speci-
fication, because the target bank has not only “relocated” but also become much
bigger in size due to the merger. Intuitively, this is to control for any “size” effects
on lending that are not directly coming from ∆distancei. Formally, ∆sizei denotes
the increase in total assets on the target bank associated with the “treated” ZCTA
i. Again, for “control” ZCTAs, ∆sizei ≡ 0.
We run regressions of total bank loan originations (in $) and log(establishment
counts) in turn using the following specification. Formally,
yi,t = π0 + π1 · Postt + π2 ·∆distancei
+ β ·∆distancei × Postt + π3 ·∆sizei + π4 ·∆sizei × Postt
+ Πc ×Xi,t + Γ + ei,t,
in which yi,t denotes the outcome variables of interest, Postt denotes a dummy vari-
able that equals 1 if the observation is post-merger and 0 if it is pre-merger, Xi,t
denotes controls on natural geographies and demographic characteristics, and Γ de-
notes Merger × County fixed effects. The key coefficient of interest is β. In light
of the financial channel of economic agglomeration, we expect its estimate to be
negative.
In this specification, Xi,t and Γ tremendously alleviate concerns from other fac-
tors that could potentially bias our estimates of β. Xi,t include both natural ge-
50
ographies (i.e., total land area, land cover types, mean and standard deviation of
year-round temperatures and precipitations) and demographic characteristics (i.e.,
ln(population), urban ratio, household income levels, labor force ratio, and housing
vacancy ratio). In addition, the fixed effects Γ can soak up all unobserved hetero-
geneities across different merger-county pairs. Intuitively, this means the variation
this regression uses only comes from within-merger within-county comparisons across
differentially affected ZCTAs.
D. Identifying Assumption — The Parallel
Pre-trend
We check if the “parallel pre-trend” condition holds in our sample using two ap-
proaches. In the first approach, we perform a visual check by plotting simple cross-
sectional averages of total bank loan originations and establishment count growths
over time between the “control” group and the “treated” group with ∆distancei >
0.18 In the second approach, we run a lead-lag version of the discrete treatment Diff-
in-Diff regression using all observations with ∆distancei > 0 as the treated group,
and then examine coefficient estimates before the lead and lag dummies.
Both approaches require long time series data. Since such data are not available
for the entire sample, we construct a constant sub-sample of observations with at
18Recall that it is possible for the target bank to “relocate” closer to its lending ZCTA, and hence
it is possible to have ∆distancei < 0. For the purpose of checking the “parallel pre-trend”, we drop
observations with ∆distancei < 0, and they only represent about 3% of the entire sample.
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Figure III-1: Parallel Pre-Trend in Bank Loan Originations
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Figure III-2: Parallel Pre-Trend in Establishment Count Growth
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least 10 years of data (i.e., 7 years before the merger and 3 years after the merger).
Using the constant sub-sample, we perform the parallel pre-trend analyses using the
two approaches outlined above.
We plot the analysis results for total bank loan originations and establishment
count growths in Figure III-1 and III-2. In top panels of the figures, we do the visual
check of group averages by normalizing the “control” to match against the “treated”
as a counterfactual benchmark of comparison. There is a clear parallel pre-trend
between “treated” and “control” groups before the treatment year, which is defined
as t = 0. In bottom panels of the two figures, we present β estimates together with
their 95% confidence interval bands from the lead-lag regressions (using -2 as the base
year). These estimates show that there are no significant differences between the two
groups before treatment, and it is only after t = 0 we then start to see significant
differences between the two groups.
Overall, there is a clear parallel pre-trend in our sample. This tremendously boosts
our confidence in our identified effects being truly causal.
E. Spatial Causal Effects of A Bank Relocation
on Its Lending Regions
We run the Diff-in-Diff regressions on both total bank loan originations (in $) and
log(estabablishment counts) in turn. Table III-2 and III-3 summarize the results
below.
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Table III-2: Diff-in-Diff Regression Results on Loan Originations
(1) (2) (3)
Loans (in $M) Loans (in $M) Loans (in $M)
Post x ∆ distance -0.0328∗∗∗ -0.0328∗∗∗ -0.0483∗∗∗
(0.00462) (0.00465) (0.00431)
Post -0.0604∗ -0.0604∗ -0.163∗∗∗
(0.0327) (0.0329) (0.0362)
∆ distance (in 100 miles) 0.0230∗∗∗ 0.0267∗∗∗ 0.0283∗∗∗
(0.00560) (0.00475) (0.00457)
Post x ∆ size 0.000111 0.000111 0.000430∗∗∗
(0.000101) (0.000101) (0.0000953)
∆ size (in $ billions) 0.000806∗∗∗ 0.000607∗∗∗ 0.000272∗∗∗
(0.000181) (0.000130) (0.000102)
Demographic Controls No No Yes
Weather Controls No No Yes
Land Cover Controls No No Yes
FE: Merger x County No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.163 0.276
N 78,298 78,298 69,928
Number of Clusters 797 797 738
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Estimates for the key coefficient of interest β are tabulated in the first row in both
tables. These estimates are negative and statistically significant at 1% level, even with
robust standard errors clustered at the county level. We run 3 slight variations of
the same regression by including/excluding additional controls and fixed effects, and
document their respective results in columns (1)-(3). Across different columns, the
estimates for β stay largely constant and they always remain statistically significant.
According to column (3) in both tables, after controlling for the “size shock”,
55
Table III-3: Diff-in-Diff Regression Results on Establishment Growth
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Est. Counts) ln(Est. Counts) ln(Est. Counts)
Post x ∆ distance -0.00202∗∗∗ -0.00202∗∗∗ -0.00198∗∗∗
(0.000225) (0.000229) (0.000321)
Post 0.00236 0.00236 0.00458∗
(0.00280) (0.00285) (0.00264)
∆ distance (in 100 miles) 0.00101∗∗∗ 0.00101∗∗∗ 0.000973∗∗∗
(0.000112) (0.000114) (0.000161)
Post x ∆ size 0.0000272∗∗∗ 0.0000272∗∗∗ 0.0000195∗∗∗
(0.00000669) (0.00000681) (0.00000736)
∆ size (in $ billions) -0.0000136∗∗∗ -0.0000136∗∗∗ -0.00000990∗∗∗
(0.00000334) (0.00000341) (0.00000371)
Demographic Controls No No Yes
Weather Controls No No Yes
Land Cover Controls No No Yes
FE: Merger x County No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.163 0.269
N 34,652 34,652 14,212
Number of Clusters 842 842 697
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
heterogeneities arising from demographic and natural geographic differences, and
merger-county fixed effects, if we hypothetically move a bank away from its lending
ZCTAs, total bank loan originations in these areas decrease by $48,300 on average for
every 100 miles the bank moves. Subsequently, establishment count growths in these
ZCTAs drop by 0.2% on average. Relatively speaking, this is a large drop in growth
rate, given that the average pre-shock annual establishment count growth across all
ZCTAs is only at about 1%.
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Overall, these regression results support the financial channel of economic agglom-
eration in that firms/establishments could indeed more likely emerge together near
banks due to less stringent financial frictions in obtaining loans. These results also
suggest the importance of credit availabilities for regional economic growths.
F. Summary
This chapter revisits the classic question of how economic agglomeration arises from a
novel financial perspective. It presents evidence that alternatively explains economic
agglomeration as a result of firms more likely emerging together near banks due to
distance-related frictions in obtaining loans. It does so by designing careful natural
experiments that exploit sudden location changes on banks after banking mergers. A
standard difference-in-difference approach shows that a quasi-exogenous relocation of
a bank closer to a region indeed causes more supply of bank loans to the region, and
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Appendix
A1. Solution Algorithm for Benchmark Model
To computationally solve for equilibrium solutions in the benchmark model, we follow
closely the algorithm in Arellano (2008). It is a standard value function iteration
algorithm on discretized grids of debt levels B and income levels y. Formally,
1. Start with some guess for the parameters to be calibrated: β, θ, ŷ, and a
discretized state space for debt levels consisting of a grid of 200 points equally
spaced.




3. Given the bond price schedule, solve the optimal policy functions for consump-
tion c(B, y), debt levels B′(B, y), repayment sets A(B), and default sets D(B)
via value function iteration. For each iteration of the value function, we need
to compute the value of default which is endogenous because it depends on
the value of the contract at B = 0. We iterate on the value function until
convergence for a given q0.
4. Using default sets and repayment sets, compute new bond price schedule q1(B, y)
such that lenders break even and compare it to bond price schedule of the pre-
vious iteration: q0(B, y). If a convergence criterion is met, max{q0(B, y) −
q1(B, y)} < ε, then move to the next step. Otherwise, update the price using a
Gauss-Seidel algorithm and go back to step 3.
5. Compute default probabilities from 100 samples of model simulations containing
a default. If the model predictions match the data we stop; otherwise we adjust
parameters and grid, and go to step 2.
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A2. Numerical Equilibrium Solutions for
Benchmark Model
In Figure A-1, we plot the equilibrium solutions at two given income levels that are
respectively 5% above and below trend (i.e., yhigh and ylow).




































































Figure A-1: Benchmark Model Numerical Solutions
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A3. Notations for Cochrane-Piazzesi Regressions
The Cochrane-Piazzesi regressions start from log bond prices,
p
(n)
t ≡ log price of n-year discount bond at time t,
in which they use parenthesized superscripts to distinguish maturity from exponen-
tiation.









and the log holding period return from buying an n-year bond at time t and selling
















On the other hand, they write the log forward rate at time t for loans between









A4. M ∗t+1 Frequency and Pricing Horizon
Adjustments
We start expositions of these adjustments by first specifying the following notations.
In this section, subscripts −tm denotes a month and −tq denotes a quarter, whereas
superscripts −a denotes an annual pricing horizon and −q denotes a quarterly pricing
horizon. Using these notations, the M∗t+1 process can be denoted as M
a
tm+1 before
adjustments, and M qtq+1 after adjustments.
We first transform the time series from monthly to quarterly frequencies by taking







For instance, if we have pre-adjustment values of 1998Jan to 1998Mar to be 1, 2 and
3, the 1998Q1 value is then 1
3
(1 + 2 + 3) = 2.
We then shift the pricing horizon of the time series from a year to a quarter by
modifying the SDF so that it approximately “de-annualizes” an annual risk-free rate












so that we could derive 1 ≈ Et[(1 + rf,qtq )M
q










A5. Sanity Check on M ∗t+1 Before and After
Adjustments
In Figure A-2, we plot the M∗t+1 process before and after these adjustments for quick
sanity checks. Overall, these ad-hoc adjustments decently preserve the time series
dynamics of the stochastic process.











(in monthly frequencies; pricing annual returns)












(in quarterly frequencies; pricing quarterly returns)
Figure A-2: M∗t+1 Process Before and After Adjustments
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A6. Robustness Simulations in Neighboring
Regions of ρM = 0.710, ηM = 0.012 and M̄ = 0.949
In Figure A-3, we plot results from robustness simulations. Although we always target
a 3% default probability across all our simulations, each time the actual model simu-
lated probability is slightly different (e.g, 2.9% vs. 3.1%) due to the numerical nature
of computational solutions. To account for such discrepancies in comparing results
across different simulations, we use the mean-spread-default-probability differential,
defined as simulated average credit spread less the simulated default probability, as
a sufficient statistic.
Notably, the highest mean-spread-default-probability differential in all these ro-
bustness simulations is less than 1.4%. That means, the highest simulated credit





















































































Mean-Spread-Default-Probability Differential vs. E[M]
(ρM  = 0.71, η
M
 = 0.01)
Figure A-3: Robustness Simulations in Neighboring Specifications
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A7. Historical Default Episodes with
Hyper-Inflations
In Figure A-4, we re-plot Figure II-1 using alternative default criteria that account for
de facto defaults through hyper-inflations. Notably, 400% inflation rate is defaulting
on approximately 80% of outstanding domestic bonds that are largely issued in do-
mestic currencies, and 100% inflation rate loosely corresponds to an implicit default
on 50% of existing domestic bonds.
Sovereign Default and Inflation Episodes
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Source: Self-computations based on
              Reinhart and Rogoff (AER,2011)
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Source: Self-computations based on
              Reinhart and Rogoff (AER,2011)
Figure A-4: Historical Default Episodes with Hyper-Inflations
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A8. Historical Default Episodes at Country-Level
In Figure A-5, we plot summary statistics of historical default episodes for countries
that are among the top 15 most frequent defaulters witin the sample. Notably,
external defaults are universally more common than domestic defaults for every single
one in the list.
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Figure A-5: Top Serial Defaulters
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A9. Solution Algorithm
To computationally solve for the equilibrium solutions, we follow a standard value
function iteration procedure formally outlined as below.
1. Guess initial equilibrium discount bond prices qd0 and q
e
0.




0 , and V
b
0 .
3. Compute optimal policies in Be, bdh, and bdf for the case of repaying both
domestic and external debts, taking bond discount prices qd0 and q
e
0 and initial
guess of continuation value V o0 as given.
4. Compute next-iteration V r1 , taking optimal policies in B
e, bdh, and bdf and
continuation value V o0 as given.
5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 to compute next-iteration V e1 and V
d
1 , as well as their
respective optimal default policies DD0(b
dh, bdf , Be) and ED0(b
dh, bdf , Be), and
their respective optimal policies in Be, bdh, and bdf .




1 , and V
o
0 as given.
7. Compute next-iteration V o1 , and optimal default policies DD1(b
dh, bdf , Be) and
ED1(b







8. Replace V o0 with the newly computed V
o
1 , and repeat steps 3–7 until convergence
in V o.
9. Compute new discount bond prices qd01 and q
e
01, taking optimal default policies
DD(bdh, bdf , Be) and ED(bdh, bdf , Be) as given.
10. Update discount bond prices qd1 = µq
d
0 + (1− µ) qd01, and qe1 = µqe0 + (1− µ) qe01.
11. Repeat steps 3-10 until convergence in prices qd and qe.
75
A10. U.S. Economic Landscape
In Figure A-6, we categorize all U.S. counties from the 48 contiguous states into ten
deciles by the number of establishments per unit land area. In Figure A-7, we plot
locations of bank headquarters for all commercial banks with total assets ≥ $1 billion
as of 2010 on top of Figure A-6.
Figure A-6: U.S. Economic Density at County-Level
Figure A-7: U.S. Economic Density at County-Level and Banks
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A11. An Example of de novo Counties
To illustrate the concept of de novo counties using an example, we start from BB&T
Corporation’s acquisition of First Virginia Banks completed on July 2, 2003. In
Figure A-8, we plot a map of county-level footprints for the two merging banks
right before the merger. Green counties denote those in which there were deposit-
taking BB&T Corporation branches, yellow counties denote those in which there
were deposit-taking First Virginia Banks branches, and the red-shaded counties de-
note those with an overlap. In this case, we sample all yellow counties as our de
novo counties. Intuitively, these are the counties BB&T Corporation first enters into
through the merger.
Figure A-8: Map of County-Level Bank Footprints
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